A SLAPP in the Facebook: Assessing the Impact of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation on Social Networks, Blogs and Consumer Gripe Sites by Richards, Robert D.
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 21 
Issue 2 Spring 2011 Article 2 
A SLAPP in the Facebook: Assessing the Impact of Strategic 
Lawsuits Against Public Participation on Social Networks, Blogs 
and Consumer Gripe Sites 
Robert D. Richards 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Robert D. Richards, A SLAPP in the Facebook: Assessing the Impact of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation on Social Networks, Blogs and Consumer Gripe Sites, 21 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. 
L. 221 (2011) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol21/iss2/2 
This Lead Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of 
Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
A SLAPP IN THE FACEBOOK:
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC
LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
ON SOCIAL NETWORKS, BLOGS AND
CONSUMER GRIPE SITES
Robert D. Richards'
I. INTRODUCTION
Until April 5, 2010, Justin Kurtz was just another college
student with an axe to grind and a Facebook page on which to
grind it.2 On that spring day, however, he became the target of a
$750,000 lawsuit by a towing company he claims damaged his car
and illegally removed a parking decal, resulting in a $118 fee.'
Rather than airing his complaints in court or to a consumer
protection agency, Kurtz posted his grievances on a Facebook
group he created called "Kalamazoo Residents Against T & J
Towing."' Within two days, the Western Michigan University
student had attracted 800 online followers, some of whom weighed
in with "comments about their own maddening experiences with
1. John & Ann Curley Professor of First Amendment Studies and Founding
Director of the Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment at The
Pennsylvania State University. B.A., 1983, M.A. 1984, Communication, The
Pennsylvania State University; J.D., 1987, The American University. Member,
State Bar of Pennsylvania. The author thanks Student Fellows Omar
Maglalang, Shannon Azzaro, Samantha Cohen, Michael Haughney and Sarah
Sharrar for their research assistance and comments on early drafts of this article.
2. Rex Hall, Jr., Western Michigan University Student Sued in Battle with
Towing Company: Facebook Group Airing Complaints about T & J Towing
Takes Off KALAMAZOO GAZETTE, April 14, 2010 (noting that the lawsuit was
filed against Justin Kurtz on April 5, 2010, in Kalamazoo County Circuit
Court).
3. Dan Frosch, Venting Online, Consumers Can Land in Court, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2010, at Al (reporting that "Web sites like Facebook, Twitter and Yelp
have given individuals a global platform on which to air their grievances with
companies.").
4. Id.
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the company."' After the site grew to "more than 4,200
followers," the towing company sued, claiming it "had lost
numerous business accounts since Kurtz launched the Facebook
page."' By June 2010, the Facebook group's membership had
soared to "nearly 13,900 members."' In addition to seeking three-
quarters of a million dollars in damages, T & J Towing asked the
court to order Kurtz to "immediately cease and desist any further
libelous and slanderous written claims' about the company."8
While at first blush the lawsuit might appear to be a typical
litigious reaction by a disgruntled company that fears for its
reputation, "[s]ome First Amendment lawyers see the case
differently."' As The New York Times reported in June 2010,
"[t]hey consider the lawsuit an example of the latest incarnation of
a decades-old legal maneuver known as a strategic lawsuit against
public participation, or SLAPP."o
The term SLAPP was coined in the late 1980s by George W.
Pring and Penelope Canan at the University of Denver." SLAPPs
have been described as "civil complaints or counterclaims (against
either an individual or an organization) in which the alleged injury
was the result of petitioning or free speech activities protected by
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution." 2 Heightened
5. Id.
6. Rex Hall, Jr., Firm Sues WMU Student Over Facebook Page; Towing
Company Seeks $750,000 in Damages for Online Criticism, THE GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS , April 14, 2010, at A6 (describing how Kurtz posted on his Facebook
page that "his car was legally parked and that he had his complex-issued parking
sticker displayed, but that the sticker was missing and the front end of his car
was damaged when he reclaimed the vehicle from T & J Towing for a $118
fee").
7. Rex Hall, Jr., Push and Pull Continues in Towing Lawsuit, THE GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS , June 12, 2010, at A5 (reporting that Kurtz filed a countersuit
against T & J Towing on April 30, 2010).
8. Rex Hall, T & J Towing Still Losing Business, Attorney Says
KALAMAZOO GAZETTE (Mich.), Apr. 21, 2010, at Al.
9. Frosch, supra note 3, at Al.
10. Id.
11. See generally George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L REv. 12 (1989); GEORGE W. PRING &
PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPs: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT (1996).
12. California Anti-SLAPP Project, http://www.casp.net/statutes/
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2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol21/iss2/2
A SLAPP IN THE FACEBOOK
national awareness about these frivolous lawsuits, often filed by
businesses to quell citizens' speech, led to anti-SLAPP laws in
twenty-nine states" and legislation currently pending in
Congress.14 Indeed, T & J Towing's lawsuit against Justin Kurtz
prompted House lawmakers in Michigan to pass a bill" in August
2010 that "would require, with some exceptions, a court to dismiss
what are known as strategic lawsuits against public participation,
or SLAPPs; require damages and certain fees to be awarded to a
prevailing defendant; [and] allow a court to impose additional
sanctions against the plaintiff and his or her legal representation." 6
In an obvious nod to Kurtz's pecuniary plight, the bill
specifically "protects people from retaliatory lawsuits for certain
free-speech activities, including what they post on social-
networking sites."" That provision demonstrates a recognition of
the growing usage of these sites, as "[t]wo-thirds of the world's
Internet population visit social networking or blogging sites,
accounting for almost 10% of all internet time, according to a new
Nielsen report 'Global Faces and Networked Places.""'
Kurtz was not merely venting about an isolated personal
experience. His message was echoed by Facebook followers who
experienced similar issues with the towing company. 9 Moreover,
the Better Business Bureau of Western Michigan gave T & J
Towing a rating of "F," noting that the "company shows a pattern
of 'complaints in which consumers allege the company towed
menstate.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
13. Id.
14. Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, , 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009).
15. H.B. 5036, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009).
16. MICHIGAN HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, STRATEGIC
LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 1 (2010), http://www.legislature.
mi.gov/documents/2009-201 Obillanalysis/House/pdfl2009-HLA-5036-3.pdf.
17. Mich. House Takes Aim at SLAPP Suits, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug.
21, 2010 ("Supporters say it would bar businesses from suing to harass or
intimidate people who criticize them. The bill includes protections for postings
on sites such as Facebook and Twitter.").
18. Social Networking's New Global Footprint, NIELSENWIRE, Mar. 9, 2009,
available at http:/Iblog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/global/social-networking-new-
global-footprint/.
19. See Frosch, supra note 3, at Al.
2011] 223
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vehicles in error when either the vehicle had the required parking
pass, or the vehicle was not parked in a designated no parking
area. "'20
While Kurtz's case has captured international headlines,21 it
turns out that he is not alone in finding himself a defendant in a
lawsuit over remarks he made over the Internet. In fact, he is part
of a growing trend of businesses and professionals suing
consumers who griped about them online. Jennifer Batoon, a San
Francisco marketing manager, used Yelp.com to vent about "a
particularly painful visit to the dentist." 22 Her dentist, Gelareh
Rahbar, fought back, first online, saying that Batoon ranted on the
Internet only after the dentist "reported her to a credit bureau for a
delinquent bill."2 3 Other patients joined the discussion, "mostly
praising Rahbar," but that was not enough.24 The dentist then sued
Batoon "for defamation, charging that the review caused a drop in
her revenue." 25 Batoon said "she was shocked" when the lawsuit
was served on her and feared "the prospect of paying tens of
thousands of dollars in legal fees."2 6 Fortunately for her, the
matter took place in California, a state with one of the nation's
earliest anti-SLAPP laws.27 Under the terms of that law, a judge
20. Hall, Jr., supra note 6, at A6.
21. See, e.g., Stephen Ottley, Towing the Line, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
June 4, 2010, at 6 (noting that "Kurtz's lawyer is contacting the members of the
Facebook group to put together a class action lawsuit"); Dan Frosch, Critical
Web Postings Produce Spate ofRetaliatory Lawsuits, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June
2, 2010, at 21 (observing that "legal experts say the soaring popularity of such
sites has also given rise to more cases in the United States like Mr. Kurtz's, in
which a business sues an individual for posting critical comments online");
Michael Kesterton, Social Studies, GLOBE & MAIL, June 1, 2010, at L6
(reporting that "[t]he towing company's lawyers said the page had unfairly
damaged its reputation").
22. Want to Complain Online? Look Out. You Might Be Sued, USA TODAY,
June 9, 2010, at 8A (reporting that Batoon wrote online: "Don't go here . . .
unless u like mouth torture").
23. Id.
24. Id.
2 5. Id.
26. Id.
27. See California Anti-SLAPP Project, http://www.casp.net/statutes/
calstats.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2011) (noting that California's law "was first
224
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dismissed the defamation counts and ordered the dentist "to pay
$43,000 for Batoon's legal fees."28
Batoon was not the first Yelp.com user to face a defamation suit.
San Franciscan Christopher Norberg was sued by his chiropractor
in February 2008 after complaining on Yelp.com that the doctor
had dishonest billing practices. 29 Norberg, who sought Dr. Steven
Biegel's services after being injured in a car accident, was upset to
learn that the chiropractor had billed his insurance company for
$550 instead of the $125 amount that Biegel had quoted him.30
After receiving a letter from Biegel's lawyer "threatening him with
a lawsuit over the review," Norberg removed his rating and review
of the chiropractor." Apparently that did not satisfy Biegel, who
sued his former patient for defamation the following month.32
In similar fashion, Chicago resident Amanda Bonnen used her
Twitter account to complain about mold in her apartment, which
provoked the landlord to sue her.33 Horizon Group Management,
LLC sought $50,000 in damages from Bonnen after she tweeted:
"Who said sleeping in a moldy apartment was bad for you?
Horizon realty thinks it's okay."34 The company alleged in the
lawsuit that it "was a company of good name, fame, and reputation
and was deservedly held in high esteem by and among renters,
potential renters and the general public" until Bonnen "wrongfully
published the false and defamatory Tweet on Twitter, thereby
allowing the Tweet to be distributed throughout the world."" As a
result, the company claimed it was "greatly injured in its
enacted in 1992).
28. Id.
29. Elinor Mills, Yelp User Faces Lawsuit Over Negative Review, CNET
NEWS, Jan. 6, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10133466-93.html.
30. Id.
3 1. Id.
3 2. Id.
33. Lisa Donovan, Tenant's Twitter Slam Draws Suit, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
July 28, 2009 (noting that the lawsuit claims the "Twitter posts 'maliciously and
wrongfully' slammed her apartment").
34. Verified Complaint at 17, Horizon Group Management, LLC v. Bonnen,
No. 2009LOO8675 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 20, 2009).
35. Id. at T 3, 8.
2011] 225
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reputation as a landlord in Chicago." 6 Jeffrey Michael, a
company spokesperson, said Horizon Group Management "never
had a conversation [with Bonnen] about the post and never asked
her to take it down."" Instead, he quipped, "We're a sue first, ask
questions later kind of an organization."" A judge dismissed the
case in January 2010."
Indeed, Jeffrey Michael's attitude is representative of that of a
SLAPP filer. Winning the lawsuit is not the objective of a SLAPP.
Rather, the goal is achieved by "sinking a critic deep into legal
fees even if the court will eventually toss the case."4 0 As USA
Today observed about SLAPP in June 2010, "[t]he Constitution
guarantees a right to express opinions, even outlandish ones, as
long as the facts are right. But the right has no meaning if people
fear being bankrupted by the cost of defending themselves. In the
process, the public stands to lose a useful source of information."4 1
First Amendment lawyer Marc Randazza, "who has defended
clients against suits stemming from online comments,"4 2 illustrated
that point by conceding "that sometimes the most pragmatic
approach for a SLAPP defendant is to take back the offending
comments in lieu of a lawsuit."4 3 Randazza "helped one client,
Thomas Alascio, avoid a lawsuit [in 2009] after he posted negative
remarks about a Florida car dealership on his Twitter account.""
Alascio wrote of the car dealer: "There is not a worse dealership
on the planet."" Randazza deflected a threatened lawsuit by
responding in a letter to the dealership, stating "that although Mr.
36. Id. at 9.
37. Donovan, supra note 33..
38. Id.
39. Lisa Donovan, Tenant's 'Moldy' Tweet Not Libel: Judge, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at 6.
40. Jason Beahm, Social Media Complaints, Defamation & SLAPP Suits,
REUTERS, June 4, 2010 (noting that "many states have enacted laws against
SLAPP suits ... which require the business to pay the defendant's legal fees if
the case is dismissed").
41. Want to Complain Online?, supra note 22, at 8A.
42. Frosch, supra note 3, at Al.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
226
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Alascio admitted that the dealership might not be the worst in the
world, his comments constituted protected speech because they
were his opinion."46
The damage caused by SLAPPs is not merely legal. SLAPPs
can take a physical and psychological toll on the defendants as
well. University of Denver sociologist Penelope Canan has
studied the effect of SLAPPs and noted that "SLAPP targets
routinely report that the lawsuit is 'one of the most life-changing
experiences they have ever had.' The legal gymnastics they are
put through often translate into physical problems."47 Canan
further suggested that "although the physiological disorders
associated with SLAPP are similar to those connected to other
stress-related illnesses, one social behavior is peculiar to SLAPP:
'the demise of the belief in American justice."' 4 8
The incidents described above all share one important
characteristic: easily identifiable targets. Yet, in an age of
anonymous and pseudonymous postings on blogs, social networks
and consumer gripe sites, the SLAPP lawsuit has taken on an even
larger nefarious purpose - unveiling the identity of the anonymous
poster. This latest, technology-driven phenomenon is called
CyberSLAPP. A coalition of groups that advocate freedom of
expression online, including the American Civil Liberties Union,49
the Center for Democracy and Technology,"o the Electronic
46. Id.
47. See ROBERT D. RICHARDS, FREEDOM'S VOICE: THE PERILOUS PRESENT
AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11 (1998) (observing that
"Canan also found that after being SLAPPed - or even just learning about such
lawsuits - citizens are less like to become involved in public issues").
48. Id.
49. See About the ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/about-aclu-0 (last visited
Dec. 4, 2010) (noting "[t]he ACLU is our nation's guardian of liberty, working
daily in courts, legislatures and communities to defend and preserve the
individual rights and liberties that the Constitution and laws of the United States
guarantee everyone in this country").
50. See Center for Democracy and Technology, http://www.cdt.org/about
(last visited Dec. 4, 2010). The Center describes its mission as: "The Center for
Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization working
to keep the Internet open, innovative, and free. As a civil liberties group with
expertise in law, technology, and policy, CDT works to enhance free expression
and privacy in communications technologies by finding practical and innovative
2011] 227
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Frontier Foundation," the Electronic Privacy Information Center5 2
and Public Citizen" is working to combat the efforts of
corporations that will file "a frivolous lawsuit just so they can
issue a subpoena to the Web site or Internet Service Provider (ISP)
involved, discover the identity of their anonymous critic, and
intimidate or silence them."54 As the coalition's website describes
them, "CyberSLAPP cases typically involve a person who has
posted anonymous criticisms of a corporation or public figure on
the Internet.""
While corporations engaging in this practice undoubtedly are
doing so for pragmatic reasons - fishing for potential defendants -
the tactic has consequences, namely a very real threat to the time-
solutions to public policy challenges while protecting civil liberties. CDT is
dedicated to building consensus among all parties interested in the future of the
Internet and other new communications media." Id.
51. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/about (last visited
Dec. 4, 2010) ("From the Internet to the iPod, technologies are transforming our
society and empowering us as speakers, citizens, creators, and consumers. When
our freedoms in the networked world come under attack, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) is the first line of defense. EFF broke new ground when it
was founded in 1990 - well before the Internet was on most people's radar -
and continues to confront cutting-edge issues defending free speech, privacy,
innovation, and consumer rights today. From the beginning, EFF has
championed the public interest in every critical battle affecting digital rights.").
52. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, http://epic.org/epic/
about.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2010) ( "EPIC is a public interest research center
in Washington, D.C. It was established in 1994 to focus public attention on
emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and
constitutional values.").
53. See Public Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2306 (last
visited Dec. 4, 2010) (observing that "Public Citizen serves as the people's
voice in the nation's capital. Since our founding in 1971, we have delved into an
array of areas, but our work on each issue shares an overarching goal: To ensure
that all citizens are represented in the halls of power").
54. See CyberSLAPP.org, http://www.cyberslapp.org/about/ (last visited
Dec. 4, 2010) (noting that "[t]he groups have advocated a legal standard for
courts to follow in deciding whether to compel the identification of anonymous
speakers, requiring notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the right to have
claims of wrongdoing both specified and justified on the facts before identities
are revealed").
5 5. Id.
228
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honored tradition of anonymous speech. 6 The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that anonymous speech plays an important
role in the expressive fabric of society. In McIntyre v. Ohio
Election Commission," the Court observed:
The decision in favor of anonymity may be
motivated by fear of economic or official
retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or
merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's
privacy as possible. Whatever the motivation may
be, at least in the field of literary endeavor, the
interest in having anonymous works enter the
marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any
public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition
of entry."
Indeed, courts have highlighted the importance of the role of
anonymous speech in this nation's history, suggesting that
"[t]hroughout the revolutionary and early federal period in
American history, anonymous speech and the use of pseudonyms
were powerful tools of political debate. The Federalist Papers
(authored by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay) were written
anonymously under the name 'Publius.'""'
As more and more public discussion migrates to the Internet, the
burden of SLAPPs on the free flow of information becomes
increasingly evident. SLAPP suits threaten to chill a popular form
of expression, namely, social networking sites and blogs.
Moreover, if corporations are permitted to unmask anonymous and
pseudonymous online posters of information, an expressive
56. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (suggesting
"anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an
important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from
time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices
and laws either anonymously or not at all").
57. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
58. Id. at 341-42.
59. Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (observing also that "[t]he anti-federalists responded with anonymous
articles of their own, authored by 'Cato' and 'Brutus,' among others").
2011] 229
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concept that is older than the country itself stands threatened.
This article examines the recent phenomenon of using Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation to quell expression on social
networking sites and other popular online postings. Part II traces
the increasing numbers of SLAPPs and the policy response to
them by states that have created laws or judicial doctrine to combat
this legal tactic.60 Part II also reviews the legislation currently
pending in Congress and explores whether these measures are
effective when applied to online expression. Part III then
examines recent efforts to use subpoena power to reveal the
identities of anonymous and pseudonymous posters to social
networking sites, blogs and consumer gripe sites, and the impact
such legal maneuvering has on the First Amendment."1 Finally,
Part IV concludes by assessing the threat to online free speech
posed by Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation and
argues in favor of passage of a federal measure that will reduce the
chill of online expression through some of the most popular
technological formats in modem times.62
II. USING LITIGATION TACTICS TO STRANGLE EXPRESSION: THE
EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION
In one of the earliest published court opinions involving a
SLAPP, New York Judge Nicholas Colabella described the
litigation tactic this way: "Short of a gun to the head, a greater
threat to First Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined.""
Judge Colabella was presiding over a case that pitted real estate
investor Allan S. Gordon against the not-for-profit Nature
Conservancy, a group that had "opposed the subdivision of a 36-
acre parcel of property owned" by Gordon.' Specifically, the
investor brought an action "to contest an exemption from real
property taxes granted by the Town of New Castle to the
60. Infra notes 63-122 and accompanying text.
61. Infra notes 123-174 and accompanying text.
62. Infra notes 175-195 and accompanying text.
63. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
64. Id. at 651.
230
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Conservancy" for a parcel of land near the Mianus River Gorge
Wildlife Refuge and Botanical Preserve."
In recognizing that the lawsuit brought by Gordon was in
retaliation for the Nature Conservancy's previous opposition to his
plans to subdivide his land, Judge Colabella labeled the case a
SLAPP.66 Moreover, his opinion succinctly laid out the danger to
free expression posed by this type of lawsuit:
SLAPP suits function by forcing the target into the
judicial arena where the SLAPP filer foists upon the
target the expenses of a defense. The longer the
litigation can be stretched out, the more litigation
that can be churned, the greater the expense that is
inflicted and the closer the SLAPP filer moves to
success. The purpose of such gamesmanship
ranges from simple retribution for past activism to
discouraging future activism."
As discussed above, the SLAPP filer does not have to win the
lawsuit to accomplish his objective." Indeed, it is through the
legal process itself - dragging the unwitting target through the
churning waters of litigation - that the SLAPP filer prevails.
Judge Colabella observed, "Needless to say, an ultimate
disposition in favor of the target often amounts merely to a pyrrhic
victory."69 The costs of defending a lawsuit - financially and
emotionally - leave a lasting stain on the individuals involved and
the "ripple effects of such suits in our society [are] enormous."
65. Id.
66. Id. at 656.
67. Id. (FN omitted).
68. See RICHARDS, supra note 47, at 15 (suggesting that "[t]he lawsuit's
purpose is realized through the process. Causing problems for the SLAPP target
is the actual goal - depositions, interrogatories, wondering what is next all
contribute to a heightened anxiety and often cause a retreat from public
opposition to the filer's project").
69. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (1992).
70. Id. (noting that "[p]ersons who have been outspoken on issues of public
importance targeted in such suits or who have witnessed such suits will often
choose in the future to stay silent"); see also, RICHARDS, supra note 47, at 11
2011] 23 1
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The court clearly recognized that "[t]hose who lack the financial
resources and emotional stamina to play out the 'game' face the
difficult choice of defaulting despite meritorious defenses or being
brought to their knees to settle.""
The public attention garnered by early cases helped to propel the
issue into the minds of legislators across the country, resulting in
anti-SLAPP laws in twenty seven states,72 and pertinent case law
precedent in two others." Nonetheless, the utility of anti-SLAPP
laws varies widely among the states. For instance, Pennsylvania,
while being counted among the twenty seven states with relevant
statutes, narrowly limits the application of its anti-SLAPP law to
provide immunity to someone who "makes an oral or written
communication to a government agency relating to enforcement or
implementation of an environmental law or regulation . . ."74 As
written, the law would have had little or no utility to any of the
social networking defendants or blog posters mentioned in the
Introduction, had they resided in Pennsylvania.
In other states, where the laws are more broadly applicable, anti-
SLAPP statutes can provide some measure of protection. In
(discussing how, after being SLAPPed, one Maryland woman's "willingness to
get involved in issues has waned severely").
71. Gordon, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
72. See ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-751 to -752 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-63-501 to -508 (2010); CAL. CIV. CODE § 425.16 (West 2010); DEL.
CODE ANN. §§ 8136-8138 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 718.1224 (2011); GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 634F (2011); 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 110/1 to -99 (2011); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to -10 (2011); LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2011); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §5-807 (2011); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, §
59H (2010); MINN. STAT. § 554 (2010); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (2011);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,241 to -21,246 (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635-
.670 (2010); N.M. STAT. §§ 38-2-9.1 to -9.2 (2010); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§
70-a, 76-a (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (2010); ORE. REV. STAT. §§
31.150-3.155 (2009); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707, 8301-8305 (2010); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to -4 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001 to -1004 (2011);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 781-6-1401 to -1405 (2011); VER. STAT. ANN. § 1041
(2011); WASH. REV. CODE. § 4.24.525 (2011).
73. See Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W.Va. 1981); Protect Our Mountain
Envt. v. District Ct., 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984).
74. 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302 (2010) (emphasis added).
232
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California, for instance, the law covers a wide swath of expression
and has protected individuals who posted unflattering comments
on online bulletin boards and complaint sites." In Global
Telemedia International, Inc. v. Doe 1, a publicly-traded
telecommunications company sued several individuals for
comments they posted on the Raging Bull Message Boards." As
the district court explained, "Raging Bull is a financial website that
organizes individual bulletin boards or 'chat-rooms,' each one
dedicated to a single publicly traded company."" The court
further observed that the content of the messages - most posted
using pseudonyms - varies widely, ranging
from relatively straightforward commentary to
personal invective directed at other posters and at
the subject company to the simply bizarre. For
example, one exchange includes "joemeat, you are
one of the stupidest suckers that ever posted here"
to which "joemeat" responded "akita: that means so
much coming from a degenerate who speaks
regularly from his lower orifice.79
Global Telemedia International, Inc., unhappy with the "less-
than-flattering postings"" about the company, sued the online
commentators "for trade libel, libel per se, interference with
contractual relations and prospective economic advantage against
several posters."' These causes of action are typical for
SLAPPs.82 Two of the SLAPP targets successfully petitioned for
75. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2010).
76. 132 F. Supp.2d 1261 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
77. Raging Bull Financial Message Board, http://ragingbull.quote.com/cgi-
bin/static.cgi/a=index.txt&d=mainpages (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
78. 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1264.
7 9. Id.
80. Id.
8 1. Id.
82. See, e.g., California Anti-SLAPP Project,
http://www.casp.net/slapps/mengen.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2010) (noting that
"[t]ypically, SLAPPs are based on ordinary civil tort claims such as defamation,
conspiracy, and interference with prospective economic advantage").
2011] 233
13
Richards: A SLAPP in the Facebook: Assessing the Impact of Strategic Lawsui
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXI:221
removal from state to federal court and then moved for dismissal
under California's anti-SLAPP law." The pair argued that the suit
was "brought against them as a 'transparent effort to intimidate
and silence individuals who are critical of Plaintiffs' corporate
performance.'"" The district court agreed, noting that the
California statute
provides that an 'act in furtherance of a person's
right of petition or free speech under the United
States or California Constitution in connection with
public issue includes: . . . (3) any written or oral
statement or writing made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue
of public interest.'
In finding that the "postings were an exercise of their free
speech in connection with a public issue," the court then shifted
the burden back on the company to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on its claims.8 6 The company was not able to meet that
burden because, as the court observed, "the format of [the
defendants'] statements strongly suggests that postings are
opinions."" In fact, in considering the context of the statements,
the court found,
The statements were posted anonymously in the
general cacophony of an Internet chat-room in
which about 1,000 messages a week are posted
about GTMI. The postings at issue were
anonymous as are all the other postings in the chat-
room. They were part of an on-going, free-
wheeling and highly animated exchange about
83. Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc., 132 F.Supp.2d at 1264.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1265.
86. Id. at 1266.
87. Id. at 1267.
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GTMI and its turbulent history."
California's law - "commonly recognized as the nation's
strongest"" - is particularly useful in combating SLAPPs for
several reasons. First, it requires a quick disposition by the court
on whether a particular lawsuit is considered a SLAPP.
Defendants who are sued in a SLAPP action can file a special
motion to strike within sixty days of the filing of the complaint.o
The law then requires the court to schedule a hearing on the
motion not more than thirty days after it is served." Significantly,
during the time the motion is pending, all discovery is stayed.92
That provision quickly deprives the SLAPP plaintiff of a valuable
weapon - ratcheting up the defendant's legal fees with multiple
levels of discovery, a tactic that often is used to figuratively beat
the SLAPP target into submission.93
Additionally, the law is expansive in its protection over a wide
range of speech. Under the pertinent California Civil Code
provision,
A cause of action against a person arising from any
act of that person in furtherance of the person's
right of petition or free speech under the United
States or California Constitution in connection with
a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to
strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff
has established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.94
88. Id.
89. Stephen Miller, SLAPP Happy in America: Defending Against Meritless
Lawsuits and the Need for a Federal Bill, THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW, Fall
2010, at 23.
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 425.16(f).
9 1. Id.
92. Id. at § 425.16(g).
93. RICHARDS, supra note 47, at 11 (explaining that the SLAPP filer's "goal
is to use intimidation tactics to throw an organized effort off balance, if not
dissolve it completely").
94. CAL. CIV. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (emphasis added).
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The law further defines "act in furtherance of a person's
petitioning or speech" this way:
As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a
person's right of petition or free speech under the
United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue" includes:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made
before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law;
(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body,
or any other official proceeding authorized by law;
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in
a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest;
(4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.95
Moreover, the California statute provides, with limited
exceptions, that "a prevailing defendant on a special motion to
strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and
costs.""6 Those costs can be considerable and serve as a deterrent
95. Id. § 425.16(e).
96. Id. § 425.16(c)(1) (noting in subsection (c)(2) that "A defendant who
prevails on a special motion to strike in an action subject to paragraph (1) shall
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for filing a SLAPP.
In January 2010, for instance, California Superior Court Judge
Verna A. Adams awarded nearly $54,000 in attorneys' fees and
costs9 7 to a blogger for Boing Boing Gadgets, a "technology-based
posting of www.BoingBoing.net."98 Blogger Rob Beschizza wrote
about MagicJack, "a portable product that allows the customers to
use a standard telephone, corded or cordless, or a
handset/microphone combination phone to make local and long
distance calls" through the Internet.99 The pertinent language of
his pejorative postings about MagicJack and its end-user licensing
agreement (EULA) was as follows:
*"MagicJack's EULA says it will spy on you";
*"[MagicJack] will also snoop on your calls to
target ads more accurately";
*MagicJack practices "systematic privacy
invasion"; and
*"[t]he 'look how many people came for a free trial'
counter on the homepage is a fake, a javascript
applet that increments itself automatically."'o
On March 11, 2009 MagicJack sued the blog's sponsor,
not be entitled to attorney's fees and costs if that cause of action is brought
pursuant to Section 6259, 11130, 11130.3, 54960, or 54960.1 of the
Government Code").
97. Judgment at 2, MagicJack, LP v. Happy Mutants, LLC, Case No. Civ.
091108 (Sup. Ct. Cal. Marin County, Jan. 5, 2010) (ordering that "MagicJack
shall pay attorneys fees to Boing Boing in the amount of $52,754.00" and
"MagicJack shall pay costs to Boing Boing in the amount of $1,221.03").
98. Complaint at 4, MagicJack, LP v. Happy Mutants, LLC, Case No. Civ.
091108 (Sup. Ct. Cal. Marin County, Mar. 11, 2009).
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id. at 6.
2011] 237
17
Richards: A SLAPP in the Facebook: Assessing the Impact of Strategic Lawsui
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULI ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXI:221
claiming the statements were "libelous on their face."'"' The
lawsuit also included a count of unfair competition under
California law.10 2 The defendant countered with a special motion
to strike, declaring "[t]his is precisely the type of bad-faith
strategic lawsuit that the California legislature sought to prevent
when it enacted the anti-SLAPP statute."'03 The defendant further
argued that MagicJack "brought this lawsuit. . .for only one reason
only: to put a stop to public debate and criticism concerning
MagicJack's unusual and invasive end-user license agreement."'"
Judge Adams agreed and dismissed the case "on the merits."'o
The case was completed through final judgment in less than ten
months.
It bears repeating, however, that states do vary widely in terms
of the degree of protection. As mentioned in the Introduction,
Justin Kurtz's towing-company complaint case motivated
lawmakers in that state to craft anti-SLAPP legislation in August
2010. Under the bill, if a court dismisses a case because it is
determined to be a SLAPP, the target will get the following, not
insignificant, damages:
(A) Three times the amount of damages sustained
by the defendant as a result of the action.
(B) Court costs of the action.
(C) Reasonable attorney fees and other expenses
incurred in defending against the action.
10 1. Id.
102. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 et seq. (Deering 2009).
103. Notice of Motion and Special Motion of Defendant Happy Mutants,
LLC to Strike Complaint of Plaintiff MagicJack, LP Pursuant to California's
Anti-SLAPP Statute, Cal. Code Civ. P. § 425.16; Memorandum of Points and
Authorities at 1, MagicJack, LP v. Happy Mutants, LLC, No. Civ. 091108 (Sup.
Ct. Cal. Marin County, Apr. 17, 2009).
104. Id.
105. Judgment at 1, MagicJack, LP v. Happy Mutants, LLC, No. Civ.
091108 (Sup. Ct. Cal. Marin County, Jan. 5, 2010).
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(D) If the amounts awarded under subdivisions (A)
to (C) total less than $5,000.00, the difference
between the total and $5,000.00.
(E) Additional sanctions against the plaintiff and
the attorney or law firm representing the plaintiff as
the court determines are sufficient to deter the
plaintiff and the attorney or law firm from filing
similar actions. . .. o6
Clearly, the Michigan legislature intended to send a strong
message to SLAPP filers. But not all states take such a firm stand
against this legal tactic. Comparing, for example, California's
broad anti-SLAPP law with Pennsylvania's restriction to
communication "relating to enforcement or implementation of an
environmental law or regulation"'o aptly illustrates how the
degrees of protection given to citizens can vary widely from state
to state. For that reason, speech and petitioning advocates are now
seeking a federal solution to the vexing national problem of
citizens facing protracted litigation simply for speaking out.
On December 16, 2009, Rep. Steve Cohen (D. - Tenn.)
introduced the "Citizens Participation Act of 2009.""as The
purpose of the bill is "[t]o protect first amendment rights of
petition and free speech by preventing States and the United States
from allowing meritless lawsuits arising from acts in furtherance
of those rights, commonly called 'SLAPPs.'."" 9 One of the
congressional findings in the measure cuts to the heart of why anti-
SLAPP protection is needed, noting "it is in the public interest for
individuals, organizations and businesses to participate in matters
of public concern and provide information to public entities and
other citizens on public issues that affect them without fear of
106. See Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009).
107. Supra note 74.
108. H.R. 4364.
109. Id.
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reprisal through abuse of the judicial process."'
One of the criticisms often levied against anti-SLAPP legislation
is that it denies citizens access to courts to resolve disputes.'"
Cohen's congressional website answers that criticism, observing
"[t]his bill does not shut the courthouse door to those with valid
claims, but instead provides an expedited process for filtering out
suits designed to intimidate and harass citizens exercising their
First Amendment rights."" 2 Cohen's bill provides that "[a]ny act
of petitioning the government made without knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard of falsity shall be immune from civil
liability."" 3 Consequently, the federal law would be qualified by
the actual malice standard."4 Best known as a constitutional
privilege in defamation law, actual malice presents a high
threshold for a plaintiff to reach. As First Amendment scholar
Robert M. O'Neil described the standard, "[i]n practice, meeting
that test has turned out to be a rather daunting task that has
thwarted many a lawsuit in which lay observers would have said
the publisher has acted 'maliciously' but a court ruled that much
more must be established to meet the legal standard.""' Parsed
differently, by including the actual malice standard in the law,
Congress would leave the door open for legitimate lawsuits, but set
the bar for recovery at a high enough level to protect all speakers
except those who hurled deliberate falsehoods into the public
debate.
I 10. Id. § 2(5).
111. See RICHARDS, supra note 47, at 23 (noting that "[o]pponents to these
measures argue that the right to sue is severely curtailed by such legislation.
They contend that everyone is entitled to his or her day in court").
112. Congressman Steve Cohen - Judiciary, http://cohen.house.gov/
index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=1244&ltemid=170 (last visited
Dec. 19, 2010).
113. H.R. 4364, sec. 3(a) (emphasis added).
114. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice"-- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.").
115. ROBERT M. O'NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 32-
33 (2001).
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The bill also borrows from those states with the strongest
protection by creating a special motion to dismiss - one that must
be filed within forty-five days after the claim is filed in federal
court or fifteen days after the case is removed from state to federal
court."' Moreover, "[u]pon the filing of a special motion to
dismiss, discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed until
notice of entry of an order disposing of the motion.""' Similar to
those stronger state laws, the federal bill also establishes that "[t]he
court shall award a moving party who prevails on a special motion
to dismiss or quash the costs of litigation, including a reasonable
attorney's fee."" 8
The federal bill differs from most state measures in two
important respects. First, it provides for the removal of the SLAPP
suit from state to federal district court."' Second, it seeks to curtail
fishing expeditions by SLAPP filers who use compulsory process
to learn personal identifying information in an attempt to locate
more defendants. Specifically, Cohen's bill provides that "[a]
person whose personally identifying information is sought in
connection with an action pending in Federal court arising from an
act in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition or free
speech may make a special motion to quash the discovery order,
request or subpoena."' 20 This provision would be particularly
useful in the online context where anonymity is now being
threatened by the CyberSLAPP filer who hopes to find more
targets - i.e., defendants - by issuing a subpoena for Internet
protocol addresses and other identifying information from a
webmaster.
Mark Goldowitz, director of the California Anti-SLAPP Project,
an organization that helped draft the federal bill, observed, "Just as
petition and free speech rights are so important that they require
specific constitutional protections, they are also important enough
to justify uniform national protections against SLAPPs."l2 1 Some
116. H.R. 4364, § 5(a).
117. Id. § 5(c).
118. Id. § 8(a).
119. Id. § 6(a).
120. Id. § 7(a).
121. Ashby Jones, Online Venters Rejoice: Federal Anti-SLAPP Law Taking
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online users are hoping the high-profile nature of SLAPP cases
like Justin Kurtz's will propel federal lawmakers into action. As
Network World opined, "[t]he good news is that the publicity
surrounding this case may help motivate lawmakers in Washington
to finally pass a federal law that will protect free-speech rights -
online and off - from unmerited legal retaliation by deep-pocketed
businesses."'2 2 A similar bill is expected to be introduced in the
Senate in early 2011.
III. CYBERSLAPPS AND THE GROWING DISCOVERY THREAT TO
ANONYMOUS SPEAKERS: ROUNDING UP POTENTIAL TARGETS
THROUGH COMPULSORY PROCESS
As the U.S. Supreme Court observed in McIntyre,23 anonymous
speakers are motivated by myriad reasons. Despite these varied
motivations, anonymous speech contributes to the public discourse
in important ways. Accordingly, when a litigant seeks to discern
the identity of the anonymous speaker, the First Amendment is at
risk. This is particularly true for speech in cyberspace because, as
one federal court observed: "The right to speak anonymously
extends to speech via the Internet. Internet anonymity facilitates
the rich, diverse, and far ranging exchange of ideas." 24 As one
legal commentator pointed out, "[t]he technology and culture of
the Internet multiplied exponentially the number of anonymous
speakers contributing to public discourse."' 25 In the Introduction it
Shape, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG, (June 1, 2010, 948 AM ET),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/06/01/online-venters-rejoice-federal-anti-slapp-
law-taking-shape.
122. Paul McNamara, Congress Needs to Pass Anti-SLAPP Legislation,
NETWORK WORLD, June 7, 2010, available at
http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2010/060710-net-buzs (noting that
"[a] number of states already have laws that attempt to deter this type of legal
intimidation, but a federal version is necessary given the nature of the Internet
and this country's well-established sue-first mentality").
123. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
124. Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
125. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn
from John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1373, 1376 (2009) (suggesting that when
"[flaced with a growing number of anonymous speech cases, many courts have
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is noted that so-called CyberSLAPPs present a unique threat to
anonymous and pseudonymous speech on the Internet.126
Launching a dragnet, through the mechanism of a subpoena,127 in
an effort to unmask a roster of potential SLAPP defendants may
indeed constitute an abuse of the litigation process.
Logically, at least in the twenty-nine states that have created a
solution by either statute or case law,128 CyberSLAPPS should fall
under their state's anti-SLAPP law, and the protections of those
measures should be brought to bear on the lawsuit. As discussed
in detail in Part II, these laws help by dismissing cases found to be
SLAPPs, by immunizing the speech of the people who have
spoken out on a particular issue, and by allowing for the recovery
of attorney's fees and costs, once the court determines that the
lawsuit was filed for improper reasons (e.g., retaliation or closing
off debate).'2 9 Importantly, these laws often require that discovery
be stayed while the court considers the early motions to strike the
lawsuit, thus lessening the burden of mounting legal fees.' 30
In addition to the efforts of the free-speech groups discussed in
the Introduction,'3 1 to protect against the use of subpoenas to glean
the identities of anonymous posters, California stepped out ahead
of the curve by enacting specific safeguards against subpoenas for
"personally identifying information" when the underlying lawsuit
involves the exercise of free speech rights.13 2  After California
not only developed new legal doctrines to address the issues raised by the Doe
cases, but have also made existing doctrines responsive to the culture of Internet
discourse").
126. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
127. See Susanna Moore, The Challenge of Internet Anonymity: Protecting
John Doe on the Internet, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 469, 472
(2009) (observing that "[i]f the website where the offending material is found
has a registration component to it, the plaintiff may ask the website for the
information the party provided at registration").
128. See supra notes 72-73..
129. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (Deering 2011) (providing for
a claim "arising from 'act in furtherance of person's right of petition or free
speech under United States or California Constitution in connection with a
public issue"').
130. Id. § 425.16(g).
131. Supra notes 49-55..
132. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1987.1 (b)(5) (Deering 2010) (noting that "[a]
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Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed the measure into law in
October 2008, the Electronic Frontier Foundationm.. observed,
One of the most pernicious threats to anonymity is
the filing of trumped-up lawsuits as an excuse to
force ISPs to reveal speakers' identities. Once such
a lawsuit is filed, speakers who want to protect their
anonymity must find a way to pay a lawyer to go to
court and prevent disclosure of their personal
information. That can be a real hardship-in fact,
even the threat of having to go to court may
discourage many people from speaking out in the
first place.'34
Given California's long history of battling these frivolous
lawsuits, further strengthening the state's already useful anti-
SLAPP statute to combat CyberSLAPPs is a logical next step to
protect new media forms.' Indeed, the state's law has long proven
useful in protecting traditional media outlets. As California First
Amendment lawyer Charity Kenyon suggested,
You just ask the plaintiff who is threatening to sue a
newspaper or television station for defamation to sit
down and read the statute and explain to their client
that if they lose this motion to strike, they are going
person whose personally identifying information... is sought in connection with
an underlying action involving that person's exercise of free speech rights" may
seek a protective order from a court. The law went into effect Jan. 1, 2009).
133. See About Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/about
(last visited Dec. 4, 2010) (describing how "EFF broke new ground when it was
founded in 1990 - well before the Internet was on most people's radar - and
continues to confront cutting-edge issues defending free speech, privacy,
innovation, and consumer rights today.").
134. Corynne McSherry, California Governor Signs Off On New Protections
for Free Speech, ELECTRONIC FRONTEIR FOUNDATION, Oct. 2, 2008,
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/10/california-governor-signs-new-
protections-free-spe.
135. See RICHARDS, supra note 47, at 20 (describing the early process of
getting anti-SLAPP legislation passed in California).
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to pay your attorney's fees. In most cases now you
can just persuade them not to file the action at all. .
..It's a very powerful tool which has essentially
eliminated defamation actions against newspapers
and television. 136
As discussed above, both the legislation pending in Michigan...
and in Congress'13 specifically single out new media for added
protection. Other states should follow that lead in carving out
protection. Without such safeguards, speakers who don't wish to
reveal their identities will be greatly compromised. Legislatures
looking to enhance protections in this area should explore what
courts have done when faced with challenges to subpoenas
designed to reveal the identities of anonymous online posters.
The importance of anonymous speech has been recognized for
centuries,'3 9 but social networks, blogs and consumer sites require
a whole new level of analysis, for the "[t]he poster's message not
only is transmitted instantly to other subscribers to the message
board, but potentially is passed on to an expanding network of
recipients, as readers may copy, forward, or print those messages
to distribute to others."' 40 As technology grows, so too does the
potential for widespread misinformation. Yet, courts, on balance,
find the value of allowing such speech outweighs the potential
adverse consequences.
Indeed, courts have found that anonymous speech helps to level
136. See Miller, supra note 89, at 23.
137. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Talley v. California , 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) ( "Anonymous
pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in
the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws
either anonymously or not at all."); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514
U.S. 334, 342 (1995) ("[A]n author's decision to remain anonymous, like other
decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an
aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.").
140. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 237 (Ct. App. 2008) (warning
that "no one is truly anonymous on the Internet, even with the use of a
pseudonym" because Internet Service Providers can trace posters' identities).
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the playing field for expressive purposes, suggesting that, "by
concealing speakers' identities, the online forum allows
individuals of any economic, political, or social status to be heard
without suppression or other intervention by the media or more
powerful figures in the field." 4 ' In similar fashion, the Delaware
Supreme Court found in Doe No. 1 v. Cahill,142
The internet is a unique democratizing medium
unlike anything that has come before. The advent
of the internet dramatically changed the nature of
public discourse by allowing more and diverse
people to engage in public debate. Unlike thirty
years ago, when "many citizens [were] barred from
meaningful participation in public discourse by
financial or status inequalities and a relatively small
number of powerful speakers [could] dominate the
marketplace of ideas" the internet now allows
anyone with a phone line to "become a town crier
with a voice that resonates farther than it could
from any soapbox." 43
Speakers need not identify themselves for Democracy to thrive.
As the court in Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc.'" observed, "[t]he
'ability to speak one's mind' on the Internet 'without the burden of
the other party knowing all the facts about one's identity can foster
open communication and robust debate.'""45
On the other hand, this notion of the importance of anonymity
does raise an important question: If someone or some company is
actually defamed by an anonymous poster, should the defamed
party have an opportunity to learn the identity of that poster
through the ordinary tools of litigation, such as a subpoena? After
all, Section 230 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996146
141. Id.
142. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
143. Id. at 455 (footnote omitted).
144. Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
145. Id. At 1092 (citation omitted).
146. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (]"No provider or user of an interactive
246
26
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol21/iss2/2
A SLAPP IN THE FA CEBOOK
forecloses, in most instances, holding the Internet Service Provider
accountable. As a result, should the ISP have to cooperate with a
subpoena designed with the specific intent of revealing identifying
information about the poster? Does the subpoena amount to little
more than a "fishing expedition" designed to identify potential
SLAPP targets?
No doubt this issue will continue to occupy the attention of
judges, such as U.S. District Judge Thomas S. Zilly, who wrote:
The free exchange of ideas on the Internet is driven
in large part by the ability of Internet users to
communicate anonymously. If Internet users could
be stripped of that anonymity by a civil subpoena
enforced under the liberal rules of civil discovery,
this would have a significant chilling effect on
Internet communications and thus on basic First
Amendment rights. Therefore, discovery requests
seeking to identify anonymous Internet users must
be subjected to careful scrutiny by the courts.'4 7
If the standard rules of civil discovery apply, this clearly would
undermine anonymous speech on the Internet. Instead, the law is
trending toward a heightened standard for courts to apply when
litigants issue a subpoena in an attempt to unmask anonymous
posters. This heightened approach safeguards First Amendment
interests while, at the same time, helping to ensure fairness for
parties and potential parties. An early case on point, Dendrite
International, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3,148 provided some guidance for
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.").
147. Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1093-94, 1093 (W.D.
Wash. 2001) (" "in the context of a civil subpoena issued pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 45, this Court must determine when and under what circumstances a
civil litigant will be permitted to obtain the identity of persons who have
exercised their First Amendment right to speak anonymously. There is little in
the way of persuasive authority to assist this Court. However, courts that have
addressed related issues have used balancing tests to decide when to protect an
individual's First Amendment rights.").
148. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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handling subpoenas seeking identity of anonymous and
pseudonymous posters:
The trial court must consider and decide those
applications by striking a balance between the well-
established First Amendment right to speak
anonymously, and the right of the plaintiff to
protect its proprietary interests and reputation
through the assertion of recognizable claims based
on the actionable conduct of the anonymous,
fictitiously-named defendants.'4 9
The Dendrite court balanced "the equities and rights at issue.""o
First, the plaintiff must "undertake efforts to notify the anonymous
posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or application for an
order of disclosure, and withhold action to afford the fictitiously-
named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve
opposition to the application.""' Second, the plaintiff must
"identify and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by
each anonymous poster that plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable
speech."' 52 Third, "[t]he plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence
supporting each element of its cause of action, on a prima facie
basis, prior to a court ordering the disclosure of the identity of the
unnamed defendant.""' Finally, "the court must balance the
defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous free speech
against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the
necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity
to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed."' 54
Similarly, the court in Cahill adopted the Dendrite requirement
of demonstrating a prima facie case - typically relevant at the
149. Id. at 760.
150. Id. at 761.
151. Id. at 760 (setting out further that "[t]hese notification efforts should
include posting a message of notification of the identity discovery request to the
anonymous user on the ISP's pertinent message board").
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760-61 (assuming that "the court concludes that
the plaintiff has presented a prima facie cause of action").
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motion to dismiss level - but did so in the context of the necessary
showing at the summary judgment stage. In short, the court
observed, "before a defamation plaintiff can obtain the identity of
an anonymous defendant through the compulsory discovery
process he must support his defamation claim with facts sufficient
to defeat a summary judgment motion.""' Nonetheless, at least
one court has found it "unnecessary and potentially confusing to
attach a procedural label, whether summary judgment or motion to
dismiss, to the showing required."'5 6
But what happens in a case in which someone is seeking the
identity of anonymous posters who are not parties to a lawsuit? In
Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc.,' the U.S. District Court established
four factors that must be considered. Noting that "non-party
disclosure is only appropriate in the exceptional case where the
compelling need for the discovery sought outweighs the First
Amendment rights of the anonymous speaker,"'s U.S. District
Judge Zilly wrote:
[T]his Court adopts the following standard for
evaluating a civil subpoena that seeks the identity
of an anonymous Internet user who is not a party to
the underlying litigation. The Court will consider
four factors in determining whether the subpoena
should issue. These are whether: (1) the subpoena
seeking the information was issued in good faith
and not for any improper purpose, (2) the
information sought relates to a core claim or
defense, (3) the identifying information is directly
and materially relevant to that claim or defense, and
(4) information sufficient to establish or to disprove
that claim or defense is unavailable from any other
155. Doe No. 1 v. Cahill,884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005).
156. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 243-44 (Ct. App. 2008).
157. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
158. Id. at 1095 (observing that "[w]hen the anonymous Internet user is not a
party to the case, the litigation can go forward without the disclosure of their
identity").
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source.159
Given that social networking and blogging opportunities
continue to increase, these cases are not likely to go away.
Accordingly, courts recognize the need to provide a detailed
roadmap for lower courts that increasingly will be called upon to
resolve such issues. In Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,'
the Maryland Court of Appeals, that state's highest court,
illustrated that precise point when it granted certiorari prior to any
proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals to address the
following question: "May a court breach the constitutional right to
speak anonymously and order the identification of Internet
speakers who are alleged to have violated the plaintiffs rights
without a factual and legal showing that the plaintiff has a
supportable claim on the merits?"'6'
The court also "recognize[d] the complexity of the decision to
order disclosure regarding pseudonyms or user names in the
context of the First Amendment."'6 2 Setting out Maryland's rule,
the state's high court acknowledged that it borrowed from "the
standards employed by many of [its] sister courts.""' Specifically,
the court instructed trial judges facing a defamation action that
involves anonymous speakers or pseudonyms to:
(1) require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to
notify the anonymous posters that they are the
subject of a subpoena or application for an order of
disclosure, including posting a message of
notification of the identity discovery request on the
message board;
(2) withhold action to afford the anonymous posters
a reasonable opportunity to file and serve
159. Id.
160. 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009).
161. Id. at 435.
162. Id. at 443.
163. Id. at 456.
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opposition to the application;
(3) require the plaintiff to identify and set forth the
exact statements purportedly made by each
anonymous poster, alleged to constitute actionable
speech;
(4) determine whether the complaint has set forth a
prima facie defamation per se or per quod action
against the anonymous posters; and
(5), if all else is satisfied, balance the anonymous
poster's First Amendment right of free speech
against the strength of the prima facie case of
defamation presented by the plaintiff and the
necessity for disclosure of the anonymous
defendant's identity, prior to ordering disclosure."
The test in Brodie, which incorporated the Dendrite/Cahill
prima facie case requirement, reflected the trend of adhering to this
basic showing. Yet, in 2011, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit suggested that such a showing may be too
restrictive if the expression at issue falls into the category of
commercial speech.' 5 That three-judge panel pointed out the
distinction between protecting anonymity in speech characterized
as political as opposed to purely commercial. The court observed,
Given the importance of political speech in the
history of this country, it is not surprising that
courts afford political speech the highest level of
protection . . . . Commercial speech, on the other
hand, enjoys a limited measure of protection,
164. Id. at 456 (citation omitted).
165. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487 (9th
Cir. Jan. 7, 2011)
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commensurate with its subordinate position in the
scale of First Amendment values," as long as "the
communication is neither misleading nor related to
unlawful activity."' 6
While declining to decide if the speech at issue in the instant
case could be classified as commercial speech,' 7 the court of
appeals suggested that "the nature of the speech should be a
driving force in choosing a standard by which to balance the rights
of anonymous speakers in discovery disputes."' 68 Moreover, the
court added that "in discovery disputes involving the identity of
anonymous speakers, the notion that commercial speech should be
afforded less protection than political, religious, or literary speech
is hardly a novel principle."'69 The case raises some crucial
questions for the future of anonymous online posters, particularly
if the Ninth Circuit's reasoning becomes widely adopted
elsewhere. For instance, will these lesser standards apply to
anonymous speakers who complain on consumer gripe sites, such
as Yelp.com or other sites that are more commercial in nature?
Although social networking and online venting is a relatively
new development, courts understand that "anonymity or
pseudonymity has been a part of the Internet culture"'" from the
outset, and safeguarding the ability to communicate in such
fashion, given the "magnitude of the protection of anonymous
speech under the First Amendment,""' is pivotal to the future of
Internet speech. As the Brodie court recognized, "posters have a
First Amendment right to retain their anonymity and not to be
subject to frivolous suits for defamation brought solely to unmask
their identity." 72
The balancing approach for revealing the identity of Internet
posters may be one way to guard against this practice if courts
166. Id. at *7(citations omitted).
167. Idat *18.
168. Id. (citations omitted)..
169. Id. (citation omitted).
170. Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 438 (Md.
2009).
171. Id. at 440.
172. Id. at 449.
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adopt a good-faith requirement as the district court did in Doe v.
2TheMart.com, Inc."'Judge Zilly borrowed from other courts
grappling with these issues and included, as a threshold part of the
test, a requirement that "the subpoena seeking the information was
issued in good faith and not for any improper purpose."'74 That
condition cuts directly to the heart of SLAPP actions, which, by
their very nature, are not brought in good faith.
IV. CONCLUSION
In fall 2010, Sony Pictures released the movie The Social
Network.' In the first five weeks of its release, the film grossed
$79.7 million"' and garnered critical acclaim.'77  In the movie,
"[t]he birth of Facebook and how it revolutionized communication,
turned Mark Zuckerberg into a billionaire and created 'friends,'
plus personal and legal complications are chronicled."17  The
popularity of the film itself mirrors the rapid growth of and
enthusiasm toward Facebook that exist today."'
Yet, the larger legal concerns today are looming from outside
the social networks' inner circle - specifically, third parties who
are suing users directly in an effort to shut them up, close them
down, or teach them a costly lesson. The weapon - SLAPP - has
been a tactic for decades, but the proliferation of online targets
such as Facebook pages, blogs and consumer gripe sites, has
breathed new life into this disfavored litigation practice.
SLAPPs aimed at online discussion pose a particularized threat
not only to the technology-driven marketplace of ideas but also the
centuries-old notion of anonymous speech. As U.S. District Judge
Stuart Dalzell wrote in one of the earliest court decisions regarding
the Internet, "It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has
173. Supra note 54.
174. Id. at 1094.
175. See The Social Network, http://www.imdb.com/title/ttl285016/ (last
visited Mar. 26, 2011).
176. Top 10 Films, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2010, at C04.
177. Movie Guide, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 2010, at W-16 (rating the
film at three and a half out of a possible four stars).
178. Id.
179. See supra note 16.
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achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory
marketplace of mass speech that this country - and indeed the
world - has yet seen."'o As with the Internet itself,
unquestionably, Facebook and other social networking sites and
blogs have revolutionized communication, but as with all new
technologies, their development also raises a host of legal
problems. Endemic to the instant technology are the challenges
brought on by anonymous postings.
While courts have long touted the efficacy of anonymity, a
recent Supreme Court decision suggests it is indeed grounded in
the Constitution. In a concurring opinion in Doe No. 1 v. Reed,'8 '
Justice Antonin Scalia characterized the Court's opinion as
acknowledging a "First Amendment right to anonymity."'8 2 The
Court, more than a decade earlier, had ruled that the government
could not force people who circulate petitions to wear name-
identification badges, noting "[t]he injury to speech is heightened
for the petition circulator because the badge requirement compels
personal name identification at the precise moment when the
circulator's interest in anonymity is greatest." Without question,
as discussed above in detail,' this country's endearment toward
anonymous speech dates back centuries - long before the advent
and evolution of the Internet.
The ubiquity of online sites and networks, and the very nature of
their split-second streaming of speech across state lines and
national boundaries, requires a larger scale, federal solution to the
increasing SLAPP problem rather than a patchwork of state
statutes of varying utility and availability. Anti-SLAPP laws are a
critical tool in defending against this type of litigation because
they "allow for easy dismissal of meritless lawsuits that clog up
the court system and threaten a person's right to free speech."'"
180. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Dalzell, J.,
concurring), aff'd., 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
181. Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
182. Id. at 2831 (Scalia, J., concurring).
183. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
184. See Miller, supra note 89, at 22 (discussing the provisions of SLAPP
laws, including the special motions to dismiss that "can be filed early in the
court proceedings and would give the judge authority to decide if a case has any
merit or is just an attempt to silence a critic").
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Representative Steve Cohen, the prime sponsor of the recent
attempt to nationalize SLAPP protection, aptly observed in support
of his bill, "The First Amendment is a federal issue and I think we
should look at protecting peoples' First Amendment rights at the
federal level and not depend on the states to do it."'15 The federal
bill includes "a simple process for victims of SLAPP suits to make
a motion to dismiss, stop discovery, recover attorney's fees in the
event that the claim is deemed meritless and remove to a federal
court to determine if the lawsuit qualifies as a SLAPP suit."'" As
discussed above,'" the legislation also contains a provision that
will be particularly useful in the online community: A special
motion to quash the discovery order, request or subpoena that is
designed to reveal the identity of an anonymous poster.'
While the federal legislation addresses the threat to anonymous
postings in this provision, it does not go far enough in providing
guidance to the district courts. To this end, the bill should set forth
a specific Dendrite/Cahill9 -type test that must be applied in cases
seeking the identity. of anonymous speakers. By codifying the
standard, Congress would preclude district courts from developing
a patchwork of applicable tests throughout the country.
It should be recognized that not everyone is a fan of anti-SLAPP
laws, and attempts to pass a federal bill face some strong
opposition. Bruce Fein, who served as associate deputy attorney
general and as general counsel to the Federal Communications
Commission during the Reagan Administration, sharply criticized
early attempts to codify protections, writing: "Self-government
and free speech are tarnished, not strengthened, by citizens
indifferent to truth. They should be unwelcome in the corridors of
government. Anti-SLAPP laws that invite citizen lies about
business are a sad commentary on contemporary understanding of
the vital ingredients of healthy democracy."l9
185. Id. at 23.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
188. Supra note 113.
189. See supra notes 141-156 and accompanying text.
190. Bruce Fein, Code Green for Impunity, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1992, at
Gi (suggesting that "[t]he need for truth is at its zenith in public meetings,
legislative hearings, and other fora intended to influence government policy.
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Indeed, strong business lobbies have been successful in blocking
or slowing down the passage of these laws on the state level. In
Florida, for example, it took more than a decade for an anti-
SLAPP law to be put in place, and "[t]he major force against the
legislation in Florida was a lobbying group representing small and
big businesses called the Associated Industries of Florida
(AIF).""' The group issued a report that countered the Florida
attorney general's office study on the issue and "questioned the
actual injuries to the targets of SLAPP" that were included in the
government's report. 192
Still, the stories of those citizens, such as Jennifer Batoon" and
Rob Beschizza,1 94who benefited directly from the strong state anti-
SLAPP statute in California, should serve as a catalyst for moving
the federal bill forward. People should not be forced to spend
years toiling through a protracted litigation process - draining their
financial resources - just because they wanted to inform others
about a product or service they found objectionable. Anti-SLAPP
laws prevent the use of litigation as a club to beat speakers into
submission while, at the same time, protecting any party's right to
use the court system to resolve legitimate disputes. As the
popularity of social networks, blogs and consumer gripe sites -
accessible throughout the country and around the world -
continues to grow, it is clear that the state-by-state approach to
anti-SLAPP laws is far too random and safeguards against these
bad-faith lawsuits should be extended nationwide through federal
law.
Enlightened debate and decisionmaking [sic] is arrested by false assertions of
objective fact").
191. See RICHARDS, supra note 47, at 21.
192. Id.
193. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
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